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The Robinson case dealt with the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity and liability arising from police pursuit of a fleeing vehicle. The Robinson Court had narrowed the exception, holding that the statute required proof that the pursuing police vehicle made contact with the fleeing vehicle or otherwise physically forced it off the road or into another vehicle or object. The Court in Robinson had overruled previous cases that had construed the motor vehicle exception broadly and held that a governmental agency could be liable even though the police vehicle did not hit the fleeing car or physically force it off the road or into another vehicle or object. The Robinson Court also did away with the previous ruling that a police officer’s decision to pursue a fleeing vehicle could fall under the exception as "negligent operation of a government-owned motor vehicle."
If the right case comes before it, the current Supreme Court may revert to the broad reading previously given to the statutory exceptions, which would increase governmental agencies’ exposure to liability.
As part of the apparent tendency to overrule its precedents, the current Supreme Court has also revisited an issue decided in 2007 in the case of Rowland v. Washtenaw Co. Rd. Commission. That case had addressed the notice that an injured person must provide to a government agency after sustaining an injury as a result of a defective highway, which includes sidewalks. The notice statute requires, as a condition of recovery of damages, that within 120 days of an injury, the injured person must serve a notice on the appropriate governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice must specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time.
The Court in Rowland had held that the plain language of the statute controls its interpretation and that, therefore, the requirement to provide written notice within 120 days as "a condition to any recovery" involving a highway defect must be enforced. The Rowland Court overruled previous cases that had held that in order to enforce the notice provision, a government agency must show that it was harmed by the person’s failure to comply with the strict terms of the statute.
The current Supreme Court under Chief Justice Marilyn Kelly has refused to follow the reasoning of Rowland. In Chambers v. Wayne County Airport Authority, a case involving the public building exception, which requires the identical written notice to a governmental agency within 120 days as "a condition to any recovery," the plaintiff failed to serve notice of the occurrence of the injury and the nature of the defect within 120 days of his injury. The Court of Appeals agreed with the plaintiff’s argument that an incident report taken by the defendant’s employee satisfied the notice requirement. The Supreme Court initially reversed for the reason that the Plaintiff did not serve any notice as required by the statute and that an internal incident report that the defendant itself generated was insufficient to satisfy the notice requirement.
The current Supreme Court has, however, granted reconsideration in Chambers and reinstated the Court of Appeals decision. As a result, the plaintiff in Chambers was allowed to proceed with his lawsuit against the Wayne County Airport Authority, even though he had not strictly complied with the statutory notice provision.
Justice Young, dissenting, noted that "the new majority’s decision reflects this Court’s more recent hostility to the notion of governmental immunity and any other legislatively imposed measure that reduces the volume of civil litigation in this state." One of the purposes of governmental immunity is to prevent a drain on the state’s financial resources by placing limitations on lawsuits against the state and its agencies. If Justice Young is correct, taxpayers may ultimately be the losers.
